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HIRING PREFERENCE ACTS: HAS THE SUPREME COURT
RENDERED THEM VIOLATIONS OF THE
PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES CLAUSE?
INTRODUCTION
During recent years, construction workers have suffered the highest
unemployment rate of workers in any industry, almost twice the overall
national average.' In 1983, 18.4% of workers in the construction indus-
try were jobless.2
This problem is alleviated somewhat by huge state, local and federal
funding of public works projects. Publicly funded construction exceeded
$50 billion in 1983, accounting for almost one-fifth of total new construc-
tion in the country.3 State and local governments were the primary
source for public works financing and for construction jobs, contributing
almost 80% of total public funds.4
The expanding federal budget deficit has led the Reagan Administra-
tion to propose cutbacks in federal funding. Although the effects on the
construction industry of these proposed cutbacks and of the pending fed-
eral income tax bill are uncertain,5 over time they probably will cause an
increase in this already important state and local influence on public
works projects.
State and local governments have sought to channel job opportunities
to the residents who pay taxes and to the unemployed within their
boundaries.6 One way these governments have ensured that their resi-
dents receive the publicly funded jobs is by enacting hiring preference
1. Recently compiled Commerce Department figures show this comparison.
Selected Unemployment Rates
1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
All Unemployed 8.5 5.8 7.1 7.6 9.7 9.6
Construction 18.0 10.3 14.1 15.6 20.0 18.4
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States Table No. 683 (1985).
2. Id.
3. Value of New Construction Put into Place (S in billions):
1970 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
Total 95.2 135.9 151.1 173.8 205.6 230.4 230.7 239.1 230.1 262.2
Public (total) 28.1 40.9 39.1 38.2 45.9 48.8 55.0 53.3 51.0 50.8
State and
Local Gov't
owned 24.8 34.6 32.1 30.9 37.5 40.2 45.4 42.9 40.8 40.2
Id. Table No. 1293 (rounded to one decimal point).
4. See id.
5. See Engineering News-Record, July 18, 1985, at 88, col. 2 (tax proposals would
reduce state and local ability to fund construction projects); id., June 27, 1985, at 10, col.
1 (construction projects "already being shelved in anticipation of unfavorable tax treat-
ment"); id., February 21, 1985, at 10, col. 1 (greater burden on state and local
governments).
6. See State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60, 60-61 (Wyo. 1985) (construing Wyo. Stat.
§ 16-6-203 (1982)); see also Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-17-101 (1973 & Supp. 1984); Miss. Code
Ann. § 31-5-17 (1972); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. § 5-19-6 (1980).
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acts. These acts require private contractors to hire local labor as a condi-
tion to obtaining public works construction contracts.7
In 1984, in United Building & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of
Camden,' the Supreme Court held that, because preference acts discrimi-
nated against nonresidents, and thereby infringed their "fundamental"
privilege to secure employment from private contractors, the acts fell
within the "purview" of the privileges and immunities clause of article
IV of the Constitution.9 Because the record had failed to show sufficient
evidence to justify Camden's discrimination against nonresidents, the
Court remanded the case, and did not address what form a preference act
must take to survive a constitutional challenge. 10
Five state courts have struck down preference acts as violative of the
privileges and immunities clause. 1' In contrast, the Supreme Court of
Wyoming recently upheld Wyoming's statute, which was similar to those
struck down by other courts.' 2 Twenty-one other states have statutes
remaining in force.' 3
7. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. § 14-607 (1979); Mont. Code Ann. § 18-2-403 (1983);
Wyo. Stat. § 16-6-203 (1982).
8. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
9. See id. at 218-19. "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges
and Immunities of Citizens in the several States." U.S. Const. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1.
10. See Camden, 465 U.S. at 223.
11. See People ex rel. Bernardi v. Leary Constr. Co., 102 Ill. 2d 295, 298-99, 464
N.E.2d 1019, 1023 (1984) (construing Preference to Citizens on Public Works Projects
Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 269-275 (1981)) (overruling People ex reL Holland v. Bleigh
Constr. Co., 61111. 2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975)); Opinion of the Justices to the Senate,
393 Mass. 1201, 1208, 469 N.E.2d 821, 826 (1984) (advisory opinion holding that pro-
posed bill, if enacted, would be unconstitutional); Neshaminy Constructors, Inc. v.
Krause, 181 N.J. Super. 376, 384, 437 A.2d 733, 737-38 (Ch. Div. 1981) (construing N.J.
Rev. Stat. § 34:9-2 (1965)), affld and modified on other grounds per curiam, 187 N.J.
Super. 174, 453 A.2d 1359 (App. Div. 1982); Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514,
518, 399 N.E.2d 909, 910, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878, 879 (1979) (construing N.Y. Lab, Law§ 222 (McKinney 1965) (repealed 1982)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980); Laborers
Local Union No. 374 v. Felton Constr. Co., 98 Wash. 2d 121, 123, 654 P.2d 67, 68 (1982)
(en banc) (construing Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 39.16.005 (1972 & Supp. 1986)). In addi-
tion, the Seventh Circuit has reviewed Illinois' preference act and held that it violated
both the commerce clause and the privileges and immunities clause. See W.C.M. Win-
dow Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 496, 498 (7th Cir. 1984) (construing Preference to
Citizens on Public Works Projects Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 269-275 (1981)).
12. See State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60, 60-61 (Wyo. 1985); Wyo. Stat. § 16-6-203
(1982).
13. See Ala. Code § 39-3-2 (1975); Ark. Stat. Ann. § 14-607 (1979); Cal. Lab. Code
§ 2015 (West 1971); Colo. Rev. Stat. § 8-17-101 (1973 & Supp. 1984); Conn. Gen. Stat.
§ 31-52a (1983); Del. Code Ann. tit. 29, § 6913 (1983); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 255.04 (West
1975 & Supp. 1985); Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 103-57 (1976); Idaho Code § 44-1001 (1977 &
Supp. 1985); Iowa Code Ann. § 73.3 (West 1973 & Supp. 1985); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
26, § 1301 (1964); Md. Ann. Code art. 21, § 8-503 (1981) (hiring preference permitted);
Miss. Code Ann. § 31-5-17 (1972); Mont. Code Ann. § 18-2-403 (1983); Nev. Rev. Stat.
§ 338.130 (1983); N.D. Cent. Code § 43-07-20 (1978); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 9 (West
1963 & Supp. 1984-1985); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 154 (Purdon 1964); S.D. Codified
Laws Ann. § 5-19-6 (1980); Utah Code Ann. § 34-30-11 (1953 & Supp. 1983) (preference
limited to resident veterans); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 101.43 (West 1973 & Supp. 1985); Wyo.
Stat. § 16-6-203 (1982).
HIRING PREFERENCE ACTS
Part I of this Note sets the background for examining hiring prefer-
ence acts by discussing the policy underlying the privileges and immuni-
ties clause, the test used to analyze state action, and the fundamental
right to work, which the clause protects. Part II examines the effect of
the Camden decision, discusses subsequent opinions on the constitution-
ality of preference acts, and constructs a Model Hiring Preference Act
designed to comply with these constitutionally imposed limits. Part III
discusses the open question of what degree of scrutiny the Court might
apply in analyzing the constitutionality of hiring preference acts. Part IV
analyzes the effect of subjecting hiring preference acts to the standard of
review used recently by the Court. The Note concludes that the Court's
requirements may already have made hiring preference acts impractica-
ble. Depending on the strictness of the standard of review, the Court
could render all hiring preference acts, including the Model Hiring Pref-
erence Act suggested in Part II, violations of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause. The Note further suggests that the Supreme Court should
prevent the creation of pockets of discrimination throughout the country
by precluding other state courts from following the unwise lead of the
Supreme Court of Wyoming. The Supreme Court should reconsider the
Camden decision and hold definitively that hiring preference acts are
unconstitutional.
I. POLICIES AND PURVIEW OF THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
CLAUSE
A. Mutuality of the Commerce Clause and the Privileges and
Immunities Clause
Although this Note is concerned primarily with the privileges and im-
munities clause, hiring preference acts also require commerce clause
analysis. 4 These two clauses find a common origin in article IV of the
Articles of Confederation. 5 The Constitution's framers held "the con-
viction that in order to succeed, the new Union would have to avoid the
tendencies toward economic Balkanization that had plagued relations
among the Colonies and later among the States under the Articles of
Confederation."' 6 Thus, it was natural for the two clauses to evolve sim-
ilarly. The Supreme Court has called their evolution a "mutually rein-
forcing relationship."' 7
Although the clauses evolved together, some of their policies differ.
The overriding purpose of the commerce clause is to ensure producers
and consumers access to the American market unrestricted by state in-
14. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
221 (1984); U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
15. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272, 1276 & n.7 (1985).
16. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325-26 (1979); see Ward v. Maryland, 79
U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 431 (1870); Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1868).
17. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 (1978).
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terference."8 "[R]egulation affecting interstate commerce" triggers com-
merce clause analysis. 9 The privileges and immunities clause, however,
protects the rights of nonresidents from the "uncertain remedies afforded
by diplomatic processes and official retaliation"20 by restricting the
states' exercise of police powers.2 This clause is triggered by "discrimi-
nation against out-of-state residents on matters of fundamental
concern."
22
Despite these differing policies, the commerce clause and the privileges
and immunities clause are rooted in the common purpose of protecting
United States citizens from parochial, self-interested state actions that
curtail economic and political freedoms of nonresidents and inhibit the
growth of a competitive national market and a unified people. Ulti-
mately, the clauses prevent self-defeating discrimination and ensuing
retaliation.23
B. The Toomer Test
To analyze cases under the privileges and immunities clause, the
Supreme Court developed the test contained in the parent of modern
privileges and immunities cases, Toomer v. Witsell.24
18. See H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949); see also United
Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 220 (1984) ("Com-
merce Clause acts as an implied restraint upon state regulatory powers").
19. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
220 (1984).
20. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948).
21. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
220 (1984) (privileges and immunities clause "imposes a direct restraint on state action in
the interests of interstate harmony").
22. Id.
23. The privileges and immunities clause generally prohibits discrimination against
nonresidents as a means of protecting a state's own citizens. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334
U.S. 385, 396 (1948) (unequal shrimp fishing license fees). The Supreme Court has noted
that "no [other] provision in the Constitution has tended so strongly to constitute the
citizens of the United States one people." Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180
(1868). See also United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S.
208, 220 (1984) (clause "imposes a direct restraint on state action in the interests of
interstate harmony"); Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975) ("structural
balance essential to the concept of federalism"); id. at 660 ("establishes a norm of com-
ity"). Moreover, the Court has tolerated neither retaliation in response to another state's
discriminatory treatment, see Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg. Co., 252 U.S. 60, 82 (1920)
(striking down different treatment for income tax exclusions), nor reciprocal agreements
between states to benefit each other's residents, see Great Atl. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Cot-
trell, 424 U.S. 366, 379 (1976) (state "may not use the threat of economic isolation as a
weapon to force sister States to enter into even a desirable reciprocity agreement").
In the commerce clause cases, the Court has been concerned as well about retaliation
becoming a burden on commerce. Thus, a 25-mile restriction on milk sources would
"invite a multiplication of preferential trade areas," Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison,
340 U.S. 349, 356 (1951), and New York's bar to low-priced milk from Vermont would
open the door to "rivalries and reprisals that were meant to be averted by subjecting
commerce between the states to the power of the nation," Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc.,
294 U.S. 511, 522 (1935).
24. 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948). The Toomer Court considered South Carolina's regu-
274 [Vol. 54
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The "Toomer test" involves a two-part analysis. A state may not dis-
criminate against nonresidents unless "(i) there is a substantial reason for
the difference in treatment; and (ii) the discrimination practiced against
nonresidents bears a substantial relationship to the State's objective."'
According to the Toomer Court, to prove a "substantial reason" the
state must show that nonresidents "constitute a peculiar source of the
evil" at which the discriminatory means are aimed.36 The Court has ac-
cepted this definition in the cases involving constitutional challenges to
hiring preference acts.27
C. The "Fundamental Right" to Work
A state's action may be challenged under the privileges and immuni-
ties clause when a state has infringed" 'privileges' and 'immunities' bear-
ing upon the vitality of the Nation as a single entity."28 The privileges
and immunities clause protects those "fundamental" rights necessary to
"the formation, the purpose, or the development of a single Union" of
the states.29
In only two narrow areas has the Court allowed a state to discriminate
against nonresidents. First, a state may discriminate when it infringes
lation of the shrimp harvest off its coastline as shrimp migrated from North Carolina to
Florida. See id. at 387-88. South Carolina imposed a license fee for each fishing boat.
The fee for residents was only $25; but the fee for nonresidents was S2500. Id. at 389.
Because there was "no assertion of federal power" that conflicted with the state's regu-
lations on the shrimp fishing industry, South Carolina's statute did not infringe the com-
merce clause. Id. at 393. Four states, however, had imposed their own regulations,
ostensibly for conservation purposes, that took the form of "retaliation," and led effec-
tively to the creation of fishing barriers at offshore "state lines." Id. at 388.
In applying what became the Toomer test, the Court held that, even if the state had
been able to show that nonresident fishermen constituted a "peculiar source of evil" by
using larger boats, harvesting greater quantities of shrimp, or being more costly to police,
the state had numerous alternatives to its prohibitively high license fee to remedy the
situation. See id. at 398-99. For example, the Court noted that the state could graduate
"license fees according to the size of the boats." Id.
Most recently, in March 1985, the Court applied the Toomer test in Supreme Court of
N.H. v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272, 1278-80 (1985), to strike down a rule requiring residence
as a condition to practice law in New Hampshire as a member of the state's bar.
25. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272, 1279 (1985). The Piper Court,
in part two of the test, used the words "substantial relationship." See id. Although the
Court cited Camden, that opinion used the words "close relation," see United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222 (1984), which it quoted
from Toomer v. Witsell, see 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948). Nothing in the Piper opinion
implies that the Court intended any meaning from the change and, in fact, the Court used
both phrases in the sentence immediately following. See Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1279 ("In
deciding whether the discrimination bears a close or substantial relationship to the State's
objective. . . "). The language suggests that the Court intended to use the words inter-
changeably. As such, this Note will use only the most recent form, "substantial
relationship."
26. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948).
27. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
222 (1984); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 525-26 (1978).
28. Baldwin v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978).
29. Id. (elk hunting not a fundamental right).
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only a "nonfundamental" right?0 Second, a state may discriminate
against nonresidents when the Court finds that "[a]n appropriately de-
fined and uniformly applied requirement of bona fide residence may be
necessary to preserve the basic conception of a political community." 3'
30. See id. at 388. Montana had imposed an elk hunting license fee 25 times higher
for nonresidents than for residents. Id. at 374. The Court allowed this difference because
"[e]quality in access to Montana elk is not basic to the maintenance or well-being of the
Union." Id. at 388.
The Court has considered few "nonfundamental" rights. Baldwin was handed down in
1978, over 100 years after the last such Supreme Court case, McCready v. Virginia, 94
U.S. 391, 396 (1876), which upheld a statute limiting to residents the right to cultivate
oysters in the State's inland tidewater basins. Yet, even if McCready remains good law in
light of subsequent commerce clause cases, see H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S.
525, 539 (1949) (curtailing of milk trade prohibited), the Toomer Court limited the."Mc-
Cready exception" to stationary oyster beds. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 401-02
(1948) (migratory shrimp).
By discussing "fundamental rights" in a privileges and immunities context, the Bald-
win Court apparently revived a theory that the Court had used infrequently and inconsis-
tently since the early 1800's. See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 394-402 (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(urging that the clause be invoked in all cases where a state distinguished solely on the
basis of residency). The revival appears to use the term "fundamental rights" differently
from the original sense used in Corfield v. Coryell, see 6 F. Cas. 546, 551-52 (C.C.E.D.
Pa. 1823) (No. 3230) ("those privileges and immunities which. . . belong, of right, to the
citizens of all free governments"); see also L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law § 6-32,
at 405-06 (1978) (commenting that Justice Washington was referring to the early 19th
century philosophy of seeing innate "natural rights" of man in his "social compact" with
the sovereign), than in a modification of the sense expressed later in Paul v. Virginia, see
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), of the rights which a state expressly guarantees to its citi-
zens through its constitution and laws, id. at 180; see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 511
(1939) (clause "prevents a State from discriminating against citizens of other States in
favor of its own"). See Baldwin, 436 U.S. at 387 (opinion of the Court); id. at 396-97
(Brennan, J., dissenting). Under the modern theory it therefore appears that, of the
privileges and immunities which a state guarantees its residents, only a portion count as
"fundamental" and only these are protected by the privileges and immunities clause.
The "nonfundamental rights," other than those in McCready and Baldwin, have been
found in lower court cases. See, e.g., Sestric v. Clark, 765 F.2d 655, 658 (7th Cir. 1985)
(dictum) (limited privilege not to take bar exam); Sklar v. Byrne, 727 F.2d 633, 639 & n.8
(7th Cir. 1984) (possession of handguns); In re Frazier, 594 F. Supp. 1173, 1185 (E.D.
La. 1984) (denial to nonresident of right to practice law before federal court, because of
failure to comply with local rule requiring an office to be maintained as a condition of bar
membership, could not be considered "an affront to the comity exercised between Louisi-
ana and Mississippi"); Alerding v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n, 591 F. Supp. 1538,
1541 (S.D. Ohio 1984) (participation in interscholastic athletics had insignificant effect on
"promotion of interstate harmony"); Commonwealth v. Lightman, 339 Pa. Super. 359,
489 A.2d 200, 204 (1985) (tolling criminal statutes of limitation while accused was absent
from the state "cannot be said to impact on the vitality of the Nation").
31. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343-44 (1972) (suffrage and right to hold polit-
ical office); see Martinez v. Bynum, 461 U.S. 321, 325-29 (1983) (public school enroll-
ment); McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 646-47 (1976) (per
curiam) (civil service employment).
A nonresident has a fundamental right of access to state courts but "upon terms which
in themselves are reasonable and adequate for the enforcing of any rights he may have,
even though they may not be technically and precisely the same in extent as those ac-
corded to resident citizens." Canadian N. Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553, 562 (1920) (statute
of limitations rule concerning causes of action arising outside the state).
Payment of health care benefits is another area where the Court has permitted limited
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The Court, however, has held repeatedly in its decisions on the privileges
and immunities clause that the "pursuit of a common calling is one of the
most fundamental of those privileges protected by the Clause.""2
discrimination against nonresidents. See Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S.
250, 261-64 (1974) (striking down only durational residency requirement of county's pro-
gram to restrict nonemergency free medical care to residents); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179, 200 (1973) (although Georgia statute which limited use of all abortion clinics to
Georgia residents violated privileges and immunities clause, the Court left open whether
Georgia could have restricted use of "state-supported facilities"). Welfare benefit cases
have also employed this reasoning. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969)
(striking down only durational residency requirement of state program to restrict welfare
benefits to residents); cf Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 64-65 (1982) (state's natural
resource "dividend" payments based on length of residency); Edwards v. California, 314
U.S. 160, 173-74 (1941) (California bar to migrant indigents during the Depression).
In most of these cases, because the Court refrained from declaring that a state could
not discriminate, the Court implied that a state could limit the benefits or the right to
residents. In these cases, the Court struck down the condition that to become a resident a
person must have met a "durational residency requirement," usually for a period of a few
months to a year. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 332-33 (1972).
Durational residency requirements violate the "fundamental right to travel," which
may be found in the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment, by
infringing a right of "national citizenship," see J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, Con-
stitutional Law ch. 9, § V (2d ed. 1983), in the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment, by creating "invidious distinctions" among the state's citizens, see Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633 (1969), and by penalizing people for having recently exer-
cised their right to travel, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 339-40 (1972), in the
commerce clause, see Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 66-67 (Brennan, J., concurring), or
in the privileges and immunities clause of article IV, id. at 73-74 (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring).
Although a state cannot justify durational residency requirements on "budgetary or
recordkeeping considerations," it can when the benefit to the individual would be no
different after the time lapse. See Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1975). Thus, the
Supreme Court upheld Iowa's residency requirement of one year to obtain access to a
court in divorce proceedings. See id. The later adjudication of the divorce would have
given the individual no fewer rights, and the state had a legitimate interest in the dura-
tional requirement to make "collateral attacks" on its judgment more difficult. Id.
As construction workers might lose the open jobs altogether if they were penalized by
having to wait to be eligible for employment on a public works project, a state's dura-
tional residency requirement in a hiring preference act would not fall within the Sosna
exception and so would be unconstitutional. For examples of hiring preference acts con-
taining durational residency requirements, see Ala. Code § 39-3-2 (1975) (two-year resi-
dency requirement); Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-52 (1983) (three months).
32. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219
(1984). In Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985), the majority refused
to hold that lawyers had less of a right to practice law unimpeded by state interference
than had other professions or trades. See id. at 1277; see also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S.
518, 524-25, 534 (1978) (discussing nonresidents' right to employment infringed by
"Alaska Hire Act"); Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 417-18 (1952) (discriminatory
license fee for fishing held to violate privileges and immunities clause); Toomer v. Witsell,
334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948) ("one of the privileges which the clause guarantees to citizens of
State A is that of doing business in State B on terms of substantial equality with the
citizens of that State"); Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 430 (1870) (inequita-
ble license fee on nonresident traders infringed right to engage "in lawful commerce,
trade, or business without molestation").
Although the Court did find, in Baldwin v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371
(1978), that elk hunting was not a fundamental right, the Court's decision followed from
19851
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Within the area of employment, the Court has distinguished between
the right to work at all, and the right to work for the government. The
Constitution does not guarantee a fundamental right to a government
job.33 Thus, a state may make residency a condition of direct employ-
ment by the state without violating the privileges and immunities
clause.34 But, a state's restrictions on nonresidents who are employed by,
or seek employment from, any party other than the state itself, even if the
restrictions pertain to state-funded projects, constitute a prima facie vio-
lation of the privileges and immunities clause. 3' Thus, the restrictions
are immediately subject to analysis under the Toomer test.3 6
II. TOWARD A MODEL HIRING PREFERENCE ACT
A. The Camden Decision
The Court has considered hiring preference acts in three recent
cases.3" In 1978, in Hicklin v. Orbeck,38 the Court struck down the over-
broad "Alaska Hire Act" as violative of the privileges and immunities
clause.3 9 In 1983, the Court, in White v. Massachusetts Council of Con-
its concern for protecting activities in pursuit of a trade. See id. at 388. "Elk hunting by
nonresidents in Montana is a recreation and a sport," Justice Blackmun explained. "It is
not a means to the nonresident's livelihood." Id.
33. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219
(1984). See also Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976)
(per curiam) (no fundamental right to government job under equal protection clause).
34. See McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 646-47 (1976)
(per curiam) (upholding residency requirement for firemen); Detroit Police Officers Ass'n
v. Detroit, 385 Mich. 519, 522-23, 190 N.W.2d 97, 97-98 (1971) (residency requirement
for police upheld), appeal dismissed, 405 U.S. 950 (1972).
35. See W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 497 (7th Cir. 1984) (follow-
ing Camden); see also United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465
U.S. 208, 221-22 (1984) ("opportunity to seek employment with such private employers
is 'sufficiently basic to the livelihood of the Nation' . . . as to fall within the purview of
the Privileges and Immunities Clause") (citation omitted) (quoting Baldwin v. Montana
Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 388 (1978)).
36. See infra note 131 and accompanying text.
37. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208
(1984); White v. Massachusetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204 (1983);
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518.
38. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
39. See id. at 526-27. The "Alaska Hire Act" required that "all oil and gas leases,
easements or right-of-way permits for oil or gas pipeline purposes, unitization agree-
ments, or any renegotiation of any of the preceding to which the state is a party" contain
a clause mandating the preferential hiring of Alaska residents. Id. at 520 n.2. The Act's
scope extended its control as far as to contracts among subcontractors and suppliers. The
Act also apparently controlled hiring preferences at refineries and distribution systems.
Id. at 530. The Act even went so far as to require that all nonresidents be laid off prior to
laying off a qualified resident. Id. at 520 n. 1. For an example of another preference act
with a similar provision, see Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 103-57 (1976) (nonresident may be em-
ployed for public works "until persons with such qualifications competent for such serv-
ices can be obtained").
Because it "owned" the oil and gas, Alaska argued that it could determine to whom it
wished to sell the natural resources, and that it could set the conditions for the sale. See
Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 528. The Court rejected this proprietary interest argument because
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struction Employers, Inc., rejected a commerce clause challenge to an
executive order of the mayor of Boston requiring contractors working on
city projects to hire at least fifty percent of their workers from among
Boston's residents.4 '
Alaska had not limited its control over preferential hiring to the initial sale of the re-
sources. The connections with private employers were "sufficiently attenuated" to consti-
tute discriminating violations. Id. at 529; see South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2244-47 (1984) (processing timber at mills in the state as a
condition for sale of timber).
"In sum," Justice Brennan concluded for a unanimous Court, "the Act is an attempt to
force virtually all businesses that benefit in some way from the economic ripple effect of
Alaska's decision to develop its oil and gas resources to bias their employment practices
in favor of the State's residents." Hicklin, 437 U.S. at 531.
The Alaska statute failed both parts of the Toomer test. Id. at 525-28. First, the
source of Alaska's unemployment was inadequate job skills and remoteness from the
work site, not nonresidents moving into jobs in Alaska. Thus, Alaska had not shown that
nonresidents constituted the "peculiar source of the evil" of the State's unemployment.
Id. at 526. Second, even if the State could have justified its discrimination against nonres-
idents to correct its unemployment problem, a justification which the Court volunteered
would be a "dubious" assumption, see id. at 526, and one that "may present serious
constitutional questions," id. at 528, the state's means would have had to have been
"more closely tailored to aid the unemployed the Act is intended to benefit." Hicklin,
437 U.S. at 528. The Alaska remedy for the unemployment, because it was a complete
bar to nonresidents, was far in excess of that necessary to improve job opportunities for
the unemployed, who were primarily native American residents. Id. at 526, 527 & n.10,
528.
40. 460 U.S. 204 (1983).
41. Id. at 214-15. In questions on preference acts, the Court determines first whether
the restrictions violate the commerce clause. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council
v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 221 (1984). Thus, this clause acts as a first "hurdle"
before the Court even reaches the privileges and immunities clause analysis under the
Toomer test.
The White Court distinguished between those contracts for which Boston provided the
entire financing and those for which it received grants from federal agencies or depart-
ments authorized by Congress. See 460 U.S. at 214-15. On those projects where Boston
received some federal grant money, the Court found that the federal regulations which
governed the grant's use had expressly provided that local residents receive preferential
treatment, and Congress could regulate commerce in any way it chose. See id. at 213 &
n.11.
On those projects for which Boston provided all the funding and, therefore, for which
Congress had not expressly condoned limiting the benefits to contractors who agreed to
hire 50% of their workers from residents, the Court turned to its decisions in Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976) and Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429
(1980). See White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7. The construction employees, hired by both pri-
vate contractors and subcontractors, were essentially "working for the city," so no regu-
lation burdened interstate commerce and the commerce clause could not apply. Id.; see
United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 219-20
(1984) (explaining White's rationale).
"[Tihe Commerce Clause is. . . an affirmative grant of power to Congress to regulate
[trade between the states and foreign nations, and] has long been recognized as a self-
executing limitation on the power of the States to enact laws imposing substantial bur-
dens on such commerce." South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct.
2237, 2240 (1984). However, the clause does not prohibit "a State, in the absence of
congressional action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its
own citizens over others." Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976)
(footnote omitted) (Maryland could require greater documentation from nonresident
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Lest anyone suspect that the White Court had approved hiring prefer-
scrap processors when it offered bounties for automobile hulks). The Court thus devel-
oped the "market participant" doctrine. The Court reasoned that when a state acts as a
market participant in a proprietary capacity, it is often "burdened with the same restric-
tions imposed on private market participants." Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 439
(1980) (South Dakota acted as market participant in selling cement from state-owned and
operated cement plant). Therefore, the state should also "share existing freedoms from
federal constraints, including the inherent limits of the Commerce Clause." Id.
The market participant doctrine, however, has never claimed full support of the Court.
See Alexandria Scrap, 426 U.S. at 794 (6-3 decision in which Justice Stevens concurred
on narrow grounds and Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall dissented); Reeves, 447
U.S. at 429 (5-4 decision in which Justice Powell dissented and was joined by Justices
Brennan, White and Stevens). Justice Powell, who authored the Alexandria Scrap opin-
ion, also authored the dissent in Reeves. A state-run business cannot be presumed to act
in the same way as a private enterprise because, he wrote, "[a] State frequently will
respond to market conditions on the basis of political rather than economic concerns"
Reeves, 447 U.S. at 450. South Dakota's hoarding of the cement it produced was "pre-
cisely the kind of economic protectionism that the Commerce Clause was intended to
prevent." Id. at 447.
Indeed, the Court's earlier dissenters ultimately succeeded in obtaining the Court's
support for limiting to a "relatively narrow" definition the market in which a state could
be said to be a participant. See South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2245-46. In South-
Central Timber, because Alaska itself was not engaged in processing timber, it was not a
market participant and therefore violated the commerce clause when it imposed condi-
tions on purchasers of the State's timber that required them to send their timber to in-
State processors. Id. at 2246.
The significance of this new restriction on the market participant doctrine was not
missed by Justice Rehnquist. Writing in a dissent joined by Justice O'Connor, he argued
that "[tihe contractual term at issue here no more transforms Alaska's sale of timber into
'regulation' of the processing industry than the resident-hiring preference imposed by the
city of Boston in White . . .constituted regulation of the construction industry." Id. at
2248 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
If Justice Rehnquist's fears are correct, then the Court's earlier holding in White that
Boston acted as a "market participant" might not withstand a reevaluation by the Court
of whether the employees of private contractors and subcontractors were "working for
the city," which was the essential theory on which the Court based its decision in that
case. See White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7. Such an interpretation would be supported by
Justice Brennan's concurring opinion in South-Central Timber, see 104 S. Ct. at 2247-48
(Brennan, J., concurring) (market participant doctrine had an "inherent weakness"); nev-
ertheless, the majority opinion merely distinguished White's "working for the city doc-
trine," by noting that a city funding public works "retained a continuing proprietary
interest in the subject of the contract," see id. at 2246 & n.10.
Certain members of the Court have already announced their dissatisfaction with the
market participant doctrine in general, and the "working for the city doctrine" specifi-
cally. See White, 460 U.S. at 218-23 (Blackmun, J., joined by White, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part); South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2247-48 (Brennan, J., con-
curring). Indeed, Justice Blackmun, the author of the market participant doctrine as
expanded by Reeves, had dissented from the majority's opinion in White precisely because
he felt that state control of the contractual relations between private contractors and their
employees constitutes "the essence of regulation." White, 460 U.S. at 219 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
An extension of South-Central Timber's "relatively narrow" definition of the market
participant doctrine to the area of public works projects may mean that a state may not
avoid the commerce clause prohibitions on regulation if it either requires private contrac-
tors to compel their subcontractors to hire only local labor, or requires municipalities or
political subdivisions within the state to hire only residents. See W.C.M. Window Co. v.
Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1984) (state acted as regulator when it imposed
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ence acts,4' the Court returned to the issue a year later in United Build-
ing & Construction Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden.43 In Camden,
the Court considered a municipal ordinance, essentially the same as the
Boston mayor's executive order in White," and merged the analyses
from the prior two cases. Although the Court found that Camden had
not violated the commerce clause,45 the city's ordinance could neverthe-
less be properly challenged under the privileges and immunities clause
because it discriminated against nonresidents."6 Justice Rehnquist ex-
plained that "the fact that Camden is merely setting conditions on its
hiring restrictions on municipalities); cf. South-Central Timber, 104 S. Ct. at 2246 (state
regulated commerce when it "attempt[ed] to govern the private, separate economic rela-
tionships of its trading partners"). The Court ultimately may interpret this limit as
prohibiting a state from compelling primary contractors, with whom it deals directly, to
hire only residents, with whom the state does not deal directly. The Court was not ready
to take such a position in South-Central Timber. See id. at 2246 & n.10 (distinguishing
"working for the city doctrine" in White). But if the Court does extend this new restric-
tion to bar such conditions on primary contractors, it would be impossible to draft a
hiring preference act able to sustain constitutional challenge under the commerce clause,
for these acts are necessarily designed to affect contractors' dealings with employees
outside the state's direct participation.
42. Because the Court did not grant certiorari on the issue, the Court did not address
the privileges and immunities clause question in White. See 460 U.S. at 214 n.12 (lower
court decided only on commerce clause grounds). Consequently, Camden marked almost
a complete reversal on the preference act's fate. Only Justice White, who dissented in
White and joined in Camden, remained on the same side in terms of the judgment's prac-
tical outcome. See id. at 215; United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Cam-
den, 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
43. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
44. Both measures set goals for local residents and both extended to all primary con-
tractors and their subcontractors. See id. at 211-12; White, 460 U.S. at 205 n. 1; id. at 224
n.8 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
45. See Camden, 465 U.S. at 221. Earlier, in White, Justice Blackmun argued that
Boston's restricting private contractors in their direct relations with employees consti-
tuted the "essence of regulation." See White, 460 U.S. at 219 (Blackmun, J., concurring
in part, dissenting in part). While the Court disagreed in White, see id. at 211 n.7, the
majority moved toward Justice Blackmun's view of the limits to the "market participant
doctrine" in South-Central Timber. See supra note 41.
46. Camden, 465 U.S. at 221-22. The Court rejected the argument of the court be-
low, the Supreme Court of New Jersey, see United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v.
Mayor of Camden, 88 N.J. 317, 341, 443 A.2d 148, 160 (1982), rev'd, 465 U.S. 208
(1984), and of Justice Blackmun, see Camden, 465 U.S. at 224, (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
that the privileges and immunities clause did not apply to the municipal ordinance be-
cause it discriminated against both New Jersey residents and nonresidents. See id. at 215-
17. Municipalities derive their authority from the states and therefore fall under the
privileges and immunities restrictions. Id. at 215. To hold otherwise, Justice Rehnquist
noted, would allow California, for example, to escape the privileges and immunities
clause's restraints altogether merely by limiting employment in Southern California to
residents of that region, while limiting employment in Northern California to residents of
that region. See id. at 217 n.9.
The privileges and immunities clause did not protect New Jersey's own residents from
discrimination by Camden, because, unlike the nonresidents-10 minutes across the Del-
aware River in Philadelphia-who required such constitutional protection, New Jersey
residents who were victims of discrimination had a chance to seek remedy at the polls.
See id. at 217; cf. Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975) (nonresidents
taxed under the challenged scheme had no access to state's legislative process).
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expenditures for goods and services in the marketplace does not preclude
the possibility that those conditions violate the Privileges and Immunities
Clause."47
After finding that the nonresidents' interest in working on the public
works projects constituted a "fundamental right," the Court found that
the city's action fell within the "purview" of the privileges and immuni-
ties clause," and applied the Toomer test. 9
That Camden provided funding for the construction projects was "per-
haps the crucial factor" in analyzing the ordinance's constitutionality,
but that fact alone did not create a "substantial interest" which would
justify discrimination.5"
The Court did not reject the city's arguments that it had "substantial
reasons" for the discriminatory preference act.5 ' The Supreme Court did
not state that "[s]piralling unemployment, a sharp decline in population,
and a dramatic reduction in the number of businesses located in the city
[which had] eroded property values and depleted the city's tax base," 2
could not justify discrimination. Nor did the Court state that a hiring
preference act could not be used to stem "middle class flight" such as
that which had apparently "plagued" Camden.5" Indeed, the argument
that non-Camden, New Jersey residents and Pennsylvania residents
might "'live off' Camden without 'living in' Camden" was not rejected
by the Court as a justification for municipal discrimination.54
Rather, the weakness in Camden's case was that the city presented no
47. Camden, 465 U.S. at 220.
48. Id. at 219, 221.
49. See id. at 222-23. See supra text accompanying notes 24-27.
50. Camden, 465 U.S. at 221. It would seem that at least some funding on the state's
part would be necessary; otherwise, the state would be acting as a market regulator in
violation of the commerce clause. See supra note 41. In striking down state preference
acts, lower courts have felt it particularly significant that the states had received a high
proportion of federal funding for their projects, because the states were prohibiting non-
resident employment on projects which they had not funded entirely themselves. See
Neshaminy Constructors, Inc. v. Krause, 181 N.J. Super. 376, 384, 437 A.2d 733, 737
(Ch. Div. 1981) (80% federal funding made New Jersey's interest "too attenuated to tip
the balance" in the State's favor), aff'd and modified on other grounds per curiam, 187
N.J. Super. 174, 453 A.2d 1359 (App. Div. 1982); Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d
514, 525, 399 N.E.2d 909, 915, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878, 883 (1979) (75% federal funding made
the issue broader than just a "local concern" in the construction project and the unem-
ployment problem), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980); Laborers Local Union No. 374 v.
Felton Constr. Co., 98 Wash. 2d 121, 130, 654 P.2d 67, 71 (1982) (en banc) (75% federal
funding). This concern for federal funding may mean that the courts had left open
whether they would have permitted the discrimination to continue on projects which
received little or no funding from the federal government. But see Opinion of the Justices
to the Senate, 393 Mass. 1201, 1207 n.8, 469 N.E.2d 821, 825 n.8 (1984) (if enacted,
preference act would violate clause regardless of amount of state funding, but lesser
amount provided by state weakened state's proprietary interest argument).
51. See 465 U.S. at 222-23.





evidence that the nonresidents constituted a peculiar source of Camden's
plight. The Court found in the record no findings of fact regarding the
source of Camden's plight, but only that the State had conducted "brief
administrative proceedings.""
The Court refused to take judicial notice of facts which might have
justified the city's substantial reasons for discrimination." 6 Because the
ordinance failed to clear the first hurdle of the Toomer test, the Court did
not reach the second issue of whether the city's means were "carefully
tailored to alleviate this evil without unreasonably harming nonresi-
dents."57 Instead the Court remanded the case to permit Camden to
show the necessary evidence.58
B. The Effects of the Camden Remand
The Camden court did not have to remand the case; it could have
declared hiring preference acts to be per se violations of the privileges
and immunities clause. By remanding the case, the Court suggested that,
if a state could prove that it had a substantial reason to discriminate
against nonresidents, the Court might then find that some form of dis-
crimination could meet the demands of the privileges and immunities
clause.5 9
Although many states and municipalities have used preferential hir-
ing," there have been few constitutional challenges. Of the acts chal-
lenged, the only one that remains valid is that upheld by the Supreme
Court of Wyoming.6 1 The key provision of Wyoming's preference act
required every contractor working on Wyoming state or municipal pub-
lic works projects to employ a Wyoming resident unless no Wyoming
resident was "available" or "qualified to perform the work involved."6 2
A state employment office had to certify that no available or qualified
Wyoming resident could be hired before the contractor could employ a
nonresident. The employment offices would conduct a statewide search
before certifying nonavailability.63
Other courts have had more difficulty justifying the discrimination in-
herent in their states' preference acts. Wyoming's act was almost exactly






60. Twenty-two states have preference acts in force. See supra note 13. In addition,
many other ways to hire preferentially may exist, such as Boston's executive order, up-
held under the commerce clause in White, or the municipal ordinance remanded in
Camden.
61. See State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60, 60-61 (Vyo. 1985) (construing Wyo. Stat.
§ 16-6-203 (1982)).
62. Wyo. Stat. § 16-6-203 (1982).
63. See State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60, 61 (Wyo. 1985); Wyo. Stat. § 16-6-203 (1982).
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Seventh Circuit,6' and essentially the same as those struck down by the
Court of Appeals of New York,6 5 by the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton,66 and by a lower court in New Jersey.67 Because its scope was not
limited to areas of "critical unemployment" directly affected by nonresi-
dents, the Wyoming act was broader than the proposed act rejected by
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts.68
While easily distinguishing Wyoming's act from the overbroad
"Alaska Hire Act" struck down in Hicklin v. Orbeck,69 the Supreme
Court of Wyoming never discussed in detail how the provisions in Wyo-
ming's act led the court to results different from those reached by the
other state courts considering their similar statutes.70 In particular, the
Wyoming court never mentioned the Seventh Circuit's opinion in
W. C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi,7' which struck down an act containing
language nearly identical 72 to that of Wyoming on grounds of violating
both the commerce clause73 and the privileges and immunities clause.74
The different results arise primarily from the courts' disagreement on
how much evidence a state must produce to prove that nonresidents con-
stitute a peculiar source of the evil of the state's unemployment among
residents.7 5
In light of these different interpretations and of the changes rendered
64. See W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 489 (7th Cir. 1984) (constru-
ing Preference to Citizens on Public Works Projects Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 269-
274 (1981)); People ex reL Bernardi v. Leary Constr. Co., 102 Ill. 2d 295, 296-97, 464
N.E.2d 1019, 1021 (1984) (decided after Camden, overruling People ex rel. Holland v.
Bleigh Constr. Co., 61 111. 2d 258, 335 N.E.2d 469 (1975) (decided before Hicklin and
Camden)). See Preference to Citizens on Public Works Act, Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 48, § 271
(1966).
65. See Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 518, 399 N.E.2d 909, 910, 423
N.Y.S.2d 878, 879 (1979) (construing N.Y. Lab. Law § 222 (McKinney 1965) (repealed
1982)), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980).
66. See Laborers Local Union No. 374 v. Felton Constr. Co., 98 Wash. 2d 121, 123,
654 P.2d 67, 68 (1982) (en banc) (construing Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 39.16.005 (1972 &
Supp. 1986)).
67. See Neshaminy Constructors, Inc. v. Krause, 181 N.J. Super. 376, 437 A.2d 733
(Ch. Div. 1981) (construing N.J. Rev. Stat. § 34:9-2 (1965)), aff'd and modified on other
grounds per curiam, 187 N.J. Super. 174, 453 A.2d 1359 (App. Div. 1982).
68. The proposed act would have required "private contractors [and subcontractors]
on state funded projects in critical unemployment areas" of Massachusetts to hire 80% of
their workers from Massachusetts residents. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate,
393 Mass. 1201, 1201-02, 469 N.E.2d 821, 822 (1984).
69. See State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60, 62 (Wyo. 1985).
70. See id. at 63.
71. 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984).
72. Compare Preference to Citizens on Public Works Projects Act, I11. Rev. Stat. ch.
48, § 271 (1966) with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 16-6-203 (1982).
73. See W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 496 (7th Cir. 1984).
74. See id. at 497-98.
75. Compare id. at 498 (state had done "nothing" to show a compelling need to up-
hold the preference act against nonresidents) with State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60, 62
(Wyo. 1985) (all state need show is "a resident remaining unemployed while a nonresi-
dent takes a job on a Wyoming public works project"). See infra Part II.C.
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in the cases decided after Camden, South-Central Timber Development,
Inc. v. Wunnicke7 6 and Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,77 the
provisions of hiring preference acts require reexamination.
C. Conforming a Model Preference Act to the Toomer Test
For a state to draft a hiring preference statute that complies with the
constitutional constraints of the Toomer test, the state must show that it
has a "substantial reason" for discriminating against nonresidents.7' In
so doing, it must present evidence that nonresidents constitute a peculiar
source of the evil.7 9 Finally, the state must show that its remedy "bears a
substantial relationship" to those reasons.80
1. Substantial Reasons
The states' chief argument in support of their hiring preference acts is
that the states have a legitimate interest in reducing unemployment
within their borders, and in channelling state tax revenues to benefit their
own citizens.8 A state may act within its legitimate police powers to
allocate tax revenues to improve the employment situation of its resi-
76. 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984).
77. 105 S. CL 1272 (1985).
78. United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222
(1984) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)).
79. Id.
80. See Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 105 S. CL 1272, 1279 (1985); United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222 (1984).
81. The Supreme Court of Wyoming stated that the purpose of Wyoming's preference
act was to reduce "unemployment among the labor force which makes possible govern-
ment projects through contributions to the public treasury." State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d
60, 62 (Wyo. 1985). "The limiting of benefits to those who fund the state treasury and for
whom the State was created to serve," the dissenters on the Supreme Court of Washing-
ton argued in accord, "affects the essential and patently unobjectionable purpose of state
government-to serve the citizens of the state." Laborers Local Union No. 374 v. Felton
Constr. Co., 98 Wash. 2d 121, 139, 654 P.2d 67, 76 (1982) (en banc) (Dore, J., dissent-
ing). However, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts balanced the interests of
the State and nonresidents differently, and concluded that Massachusetts' "interest in
assuring that its limited resources are preserved for the benefit of its residents" did not
justify discriminating against nonresidents. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 393
Mass. 1201, 1207, 469 N.E.2d 821, 825-26 (1984).
General statistics on the reliance of the states on federal funding point out an inherent
weakness in the states' argument that a discriminatory allocation of tax revenues can
justifiably be limited to those who contribute to the state's treasury. Every state relies
heavily on federal funds and grants to support construction projects and other state activ-
ities. In 1982, for example, state and local governments looked to the federal government
for $87 billion, or 16% of their total revenue, and, from 1978 through 1982, received on
average over 18% of their total revenue from federal sources:
Revenue From Federal Government
1970 1975 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
$ In Billions 21.9 47.0 69.6 75.2 80.3 90.3 86.9
% of Total
State and Local
Revenues 14.6 17.8 18.7 18.6 20.6 17.8 15.9
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dents. But, the Supreme Court, in United Building & Construction
Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden,82 has rejected the argument that, as
a matter of law, a state's expenditures on public works projects justifies
barring nonresidents from exercising their "fundamental" right to obtain
employment from private contractors.83
The Court reviewed other reasons proposed by Camden to justify its
discrimination. These reasons included eradicating unemployment
among its citizens, stopping a population decline, and halting a reduction
in the tax base and in property values. Because the Court refrained from
stating that these reasons could not qualify as "substantial," the Court's
dictum suggests that a state might have "substantial reasons" to discrim-
inate against nonresidents to alleviate these problems. In short, the
Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States Table No. 445 (1985)
(rounding to one decimal point).
In each year from 1975, the amount of the federal funding received by the states ex-
ceeded greatly the state's capital outlays for construction:




Billions) 21.9 47.0 69.6 75.2 83.0 90.3 86.9
State Capital Outlay
- Construction ($
in Billions) 24.3 36.4 36.2 43.3 51.5 55.0 53.3
Id. (rounding to one decimal point).
A number of courts have already noted that a state's receipt of federal grant money for
its public works undercuts its argument that it should be able to benefit its own citizens at
the expense of nonresidents. See Neshaminy Constructors, Inc. v. Krause, 181 N.J.
Super. 376, 384, 437 A.2d 733, 737 (Ch. Div. 1981), afFd and modified on other grounds
per curiam, 187 N.J. Super. 174, 453 A.2d 1359 (App. Div. 1982); Salla v. County of
Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 525, 399 N.E.2d 909, 915, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878, 883 (1979), cert.
denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980); Laborers Local Union No. 374 v. Felton Constr. Co., 98
Wash. 2d 121, 130, 654 P.2d 67, 71 (1982) (en banc).
Furthermore, if the source of the tax revenue is used to justify discrimination, states
with preference acts in force would find collectively that they could assert that argument
less persuasively to justify enforcement of their preference acts than could those states
which do not have such acts. To illustrate broadly, although on average and as a group
the states with valid preference acts paid per capita lower federal income taxes than did
states without such preference acts ($1109 compared to $1162 in 1982), on average they
received slightly more per capita in federal funds ($2872 compared to $2823 in 1983).
See Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States Table Nos. 504 & 513
(1985) (author's calculations); see also N.Y. Times, June 19, 1985, at D27, col. 4 (64% of
the states with preference acts, compared to only 57% of the states without such acts,
received more per capita in federal revenue than they paid in federal taxes for fiscal year
1984) (author's calculations). See infra note 100.
82. 465 U.S. 208 (1984).
83. "The fact that Camden is expending its own funds or funds it administers in
accordance with the terms of a grant is certainly a factor-perhaps the crucial factor-to
be considered in evaluating whether the statute's discrimination violates the Privileges
and Immunities Clause," Justice Rehnquist wrote. Camden, 465 U.S. at 221. "But it
does not remove the Camden ordinance completely from the purview of the Clause." Id.;
cf. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 (1978) (Alaska's ownership of oil and gas "sim-
ply constitutes insufficient justification for the pervasive discrimination against nonresi-
dents that the Act mandates.").
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Court might permit a state to use a hiring preference act to remedy the
kind of "decay" which "plagu[ed]" Camden.84
But in Camden's case, the city had to show something more than "de-
cay." Camden used the argument that, as long as one Camden resident
was unemployed, any non-Camden resident who took a public works job
in the city was a peculiar source of the evil faced by the unemployed
resident because the nonresident "'live[d] off' Camden without 'living
in' Camden."85 Athough aware of Camden's 11.5% unemployment
rate,86 the Supreme Court nevertheless remanded the case for further
findings of fact on the connection between Camden's plight and the non-
residents who held public works jobs.87 The remand indicated that the
state would be required to provide significant evidence to the court to
establish that nonresidents had caused the unemployment condition
among residents.88
Earlier, in Hicklin v. Orbeck,89 the Supreme Court had determined
that conditions peculiar to the residents themselves probably could not
justify finding that nonresidents had caused Alaska's unemployment.
The unemployment among Alaska's native American populations re-
sulted from "their lack of education and job training or because of their
geographical remoteness from job opportunities."9 For these reasons,
84. See Camden, 465 U.S. at 222-23.
85. Id. at 222.
86. In the opinion below, the Supreme Court of New Jersey referred to the finding in
the City Council's ordinance that Camden had an 11.5% unemployment rate compared
to 8.1% for New Jersey and 7.6% for the county. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades
Council v. Mayor of Camden, 88 N.J. 317, 323, 443 A.2d 148, 151 (1982), rev'd, 465 U.S.
208 (1984).
87. See Camden, 465 U.S. at 223.
88. See id.; see also Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526 (1978) ("major cause of
Alaska's high unemployment was not the influx of nonresidents seeking employment").
Some lower courts have recognized this constitutional requirement of a causal connec-
tion. For example, the New York Court of Appeals rejected as simplistic the argument
that just because a nonresident was employed, he or she therefore constituted a "'pecu-
liar source' of the evil" confronting the unemployed resident. See Salla v. County of
Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 523, 399 N.E.2d 909, 913-14, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878, 882 (1979),
cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980). Because Washington had shown no "evil" represented
by nonresidents, the Supreme Court of Washington also rejected the State's argument
that "by keeping within the state wages from public works projects, local economies wll
be strengthened." Laborers Local Union No. 374 v. Felton Constr. Co., 98 Wash. 2d
121, 127, 654 P.2d 67, 70 (1982) (en banc). See also Neshaminy Constructors, Inc. v.
Krause, 181 N.J. Super. 376, 385, 437 A.2d 733, 738 (Ch. Div. 1981) ("[A]bsent a special
showing of specific dangers posed by out-of-state employees, [New Jersey] may not at-
tempt to resolve its problems on the backs of citizens of [its] neighboring states."), aff'd
and modified on other grounds per curiam, 187 N.J. Super. 174, 453 A.2d 1359 (App.
Div. 1982).
In contrast, the Wyoming court adopted precisely this reasoning which other courts
had rejected and which the Supreme Court labeled as insufficient justification. See State
v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60, 62-63 (WVyo. 1985) (quoting the State's brief, the court stated
that the evil to which the preference act was aimed was "a resident remaining unem-
ployed while a nonresident takes a job on a Wyoming public works project.")
89. 437 U.S. 518 (1978).
90. Id. at 526-27.
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the "influx" of nonresidents into Alaska was merely a "symptom" of the
conditions in the state.9' To prove a substantial reason for barring non-
residents, the state had to show that nonresident workers had caused the
unemployment, not merely that their presence was a "symptom" of con-
ditions in the state.
It follows from the Court's concern for a causal connection that, even
if discrimination could have been justified by a sufficient connection at
one time, that discrimination can continue only as long as the nonresi-
dents "constitute a peculiar source of the evil."9 Should the evil itself
cease, the Court's concern may mean that the discriminatory treatment
also should cease.93
The Court has required a state to show a causal connection between
the nonresidents and the evil they allegedly pose to residents. For the
"Union of the States" to succeed and prosper, an individual state must
not be allowed either to isolate itself from conditions affecting the nation
as a whole, or attempt to shift the burden of its own difficulties to the
people of other states.94
91. See id. at 526, 527 n.10. Indeed, the Court even stated that it was a "dubious"
assumption that the State ever could "validly attempt to alleviate its unemployment prob-
lem by requiring private employers within the State to discriminate against nonresi-
dents." Id. at 526.
92. See Camden, 465 U.S. at 222 (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398
(1948)).
93. None of the statutes currently in force have provisions under which the preferen-
tial treatment would be withdrawn. See, e.g., Conn. Gen. Stat. § 31-52a (1983); Del.
Code Ann. tit. 29, § 6913 (1983); N.D. Cent. Code § 43-07-20 (1978). All the acts, ex-
cept those of California and Wisconsin, operate with no regard to whether nonresidents
cause unemployment within the state. See, e.g., Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 26, § 1301
(1964); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 338.130 (1983); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, § 154 (Purdon 1964).
The California and Wisconsin statutes, although triggered by an administrative finding
that a "period of extraordinary unemployment" exists, condition the cause of the unem-
ployment not on nonresidents, as required by Camden, see 465 U.S. at 222-23, but on
"industrial depression" generally. See Cal. Lab. Code § 2012 (West 1971); Wis. Stat.
Ann. § 101.43 (West 1973 & Supp. 1985). Two statutes operate without reference to
unemployment. See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 255.04 (West 1975 & Supp. 1985) (preference re-
quired if at no higher cost); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 9 (West 1963 & Supp. 1984-1985)
(preference required if at same quality and at no higher cost). Therefore, none of the
preference acts currently in force would likely withstand the Court's scrutiny of how they
determine nonresidents to be the "peculiar source of the evil" of unemployment within
the state.
94. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 532-34 (1978); see also Camden, 465 U.S. at
220 (policy under the privileges and immunities clause is "comity" among the states);
Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 (1975) (privileges and immunities clause
"implicates not only the individual's right to nondiscriminatory treatment but also, per-
haps more so, the structural balance essential to the concept of federalism"). The Court
frowns on "parochial legislation" where a state's "presumably legitimate goal was sought
to be achieved by the illegitimate means of isolating the State from the national econ-
omy." City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 627 (1978). Nor may a state
"isolate itself from difficulties common to all [states] by restraining the transportation of
persons and property across its borders." Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 173
(1941). The Constitution was never intended to permit the states to take whatever meas-
ures they could devise to benefit their citizens during "times of stress and strain." Bald-




In its remand of Camden, the Supreme Court hinted at what kind of
evidence a state would be required to supply to the Court to justify a
discriminatory preference act." The record contained comparative sta-
tistics on the difference between Camden's high level of unemployment
and unemployment levels in the state and in the county.96 But, without
more, comparative statistics failed to persuade the Court.
The Court in Camden refused to take "judicial notice of Camden's
decay,"97 and implied that the city should have been required to conduct
a "trial" or engage in some other proceedings by which "findings of fact"
could be made.98 A state would have to conduct an investigation more
thorough than "the brief administrative proceedings that led to approval
of the ordinance by the State Treasurer."'99
The lower courts which have examined their states' preference acts
generally have called for a quantitative "cost-benefit" analysis in which
evidence of the net effect of increased employment among state residents
is weighed against the higher costs associated with barring nonresident
workers and contractors who were willing to do the job at lower costs. 00
95. See Camden, 465 U.S. at 223.
96. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 88 NJ. 317,
323, 443 A.2d 148, 151 (1982) (Camden: 11.5%; New Jersey: 8.1%; county: 7.6%), rev'd,
465 U.S. 208 (1984).
97. Camden, 465 U.S. at 223.
98. See id.
99. Id.
100. See W.C.M. Window Co. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 498 (7th Cir. 1984). Evi-
dence was required because the consequences of the preference act's barring nonresident
workers were not "as clear as those of allowing carriers of Bubonic plague to enter the
state without quarantine or nonresident students to attend the University of Illinois free
of charge." Id.; see also Laborers Local Union No. 374 v. Felton Constr. Co., 98 Wash.
2d 121, 129, 654 P.2d 67, 70 (1982) (en banc) (state provided insufficient evidence). Some
courts have been concerned that a ban on nonresidents, who would presumably have
agreed to accept lower wages or fewer benefits to do the work, might impair the project's
feasibility by raising costs prohibitively. Such a consequence could result in a net de-
crease in employment across the state. See W.CGM. Window Co., 730 F.2d at 498 (state
would have to show court that preference act would not have a "boomerang" effect);
Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 524, 399 N.E.2d 909, 914, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878,
883 (1979) (act might "deter contractors from bidding on New York public works jobs
altogether"), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980); cf. Fla. Stat. Ann. § 255.04 (West 1975 &
Supp. 1985) (preference required only if at no greater cost); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 61, § 9
(West 1963 & Supp. 1984-1985) (preference required if at same quality and at no higher
cost).
The Supreme Court of Wyoming's Chief Justice noted that the record before the Wyo-
ming court did not "demonstrate" that the state had established a "nexus" between the
unemployment and the nonresidents working on state-funded projects. See State v.
Antonich, 694 P.2d 60, 64 (Wyo. 1985) (Thomas, C.J., concurring). Indeed, the opinion
made no mention that a legislative committee had investigated the reasons underlying the
unemployment conditions in Wyoming's construction industry. Also, no mention was
made of any fact-finding having been conducted by a trial court. See id. at 60-64. It
appears that the Wyoming court accepted as evidence precisely the type of "conclusory"
findings on the justification for discrimination which the Massachusetts Justices made
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Because it is possible that nonresidents would stop threatening to
cause unemployment among residents, the state should continually moni-
tor the situation on its public works projects to make sure that the state's
discrimination remained justified. Close monitoring would be important
because of the Court's concern for a causal connection between nonresi-
dent discrimination and the unemployment among residents. Conse-
quently, a hiring preference act should set forth the procedural steps for
the state's administration to follow in approving a preference in favor of
its residents, and in providing continual reports to ensure that the sub-
stantial reasons for discrimination still justified barring nonresidents. A
preference act establishing an "across-the-board grant of a job prefer-
ence," 10 with no procedures for imposing and withdrawing the inequita-
ble treatment, would not be flexible enough to adapt to changed
conditions in the construction industry. Such an act would thus fail to
meet the Court's requirement that the state show sufficient evidence to
clear would be inadequate in their State. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 393
Mass. 1201, 1205 n.5, 469 N.E.2d 821, 824 n.5 (1984).
Actually, it would be hard for a state to show, on a statewide basis, that nonresidents
had caused the unemployment within the state. It is true that unemployment rates in the
construction industry have been consistently among the highest rates by industry group
in the country:
Unemployment Rate By Industry (%)
1975 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983
All Unemployed 8.5 5.8 7.1 7.6 9.7 9.6
Construction 18.0 10.3 14.1 15.6 20.0 18.4
U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States Table No. 683 (1985).
But, on a statewide basis, the group of twenty-two states that have preference acts which
remain valid has had on average each year from 1979 through 1983 a lower unemploy-
ment rate than has the group of states without such statutes:
Total Unemployed (%)
Average
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1979-1983
National Average 5.8 7.1 7T 9-7 __9T 8.0
Average for
States with
Preference Acts 5.4 6.4 6.9 8.6 8.9 7.2
Average for
States without
Preference Acts 5.7 7.2 7.6 9.4 9.6 7.9
See id. at Table No. 686 (author's calculations). These statewide unemployment levels
are illustrations and might not reflect unemployment levels within the construction in-
dustry or within the area of publicly funded construction. The disparity in condition,
however, which is to the benefit of those states that have discriminatory preference acts,
suggests broadly that as a group the states with preference acts would be unable to show
that nonresidents-who, in essence, are citizens of the group of states which have the
higher average statewide unemployment-are the necessary cause of their own unem-
ployment problems.
Furthermore, even if at one time the states could have shown a justification for prefer-
ential treatment, the fact that their average statewide employment is higher than the
states without preference acts suggests that the states with such acts would have a hard
time justifying continuing the discrimination.
101. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 528 (1978).
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justify the discrimination based on a link between nonresidents and the
unemployment sought to be alleviated. 0 2
3. Substantial Relationship
Once the state has shown enough "evidence" of "substantial reasons"
for enacting or enforcing a preference act, the final hurdle of the Toomer
test requires that the state's discriminatory remedy bear a "substantial
relationship" to alleviating unemployment. 10 3
The Court struck down the "Alaska Hire Act" because Alaska had
not shown that nonresidents constituted a peculiar source of the evil of
unemployment among Alaska's native Americans."~ But, even if the
state had proved the causal connection, the Act would still have failed to
sustain challenge under the privileges and immunities clause because the
state's remedy bore no substantial relation to the unemployment prob-
lem.' 05 The Act made no distinction between Alaskan residents who
were unemployed and those who were not. "Alaska Hire simply grants
all Alaskans, regardless of their employment status, education, or train-
ing, a flat employment preference for all jobs covered by the Act,"' 0 6
Justice Brennan noted. "A highly skilled and educated resident who has
never been unemployed is entitled to precisely the same preferential
treatment as the unskilled, habitually unemployed Arctic Eskimo en-
rolled in a job-training program."'0 7 A preference act would have to be
"more closely tailored to aid the unemployed" than was Alaska's over-
broad statute.'018
Although the Camden Court noted that the city's ordinance, which
was "limited in scope to employees working directly on city public works
projects," was not as broad as the act which the Court found excessive in
Hicklin v. Orbeck, the Court could not consider whether Camden's meth-
ods were "closely related" to solving its residents' unemployment prob-
lem.109 The record contained evidence insufficient to determine whether
102. It would appear that none of the currently enforceable preference acts provides
enough flexibility to meet these requirements, because they all impose blanket bars to
nonresidents instead of establishing procedural guidelines. See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann.
§ 14-607 (1979); Iowa Code Ann. § 73.3 (Vest 1973 & Supp. 1985); N.D. Cent. Code
§ 43-07-20 (1978).
103. Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272, 1279 (1985); see United Bldg. &
Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 222 (1984) ("close relation");
Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1978) ("closely tailored").
104. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526 (1978).
105. Id. at 527.
106. Id.
107. Id.; see also Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 393 Mass. 1201, 1203-06, 469
N.E.2d 821, 823-25 (1984) (proposed statute which did not limit preference to the unem-
ployed was not closely related to state's interest despite its limited reach to areas of "criti-
cal unemployment"); Salla v. County of Monroe, 48 N.Y.2d 514, 523, 399 N.E.2d 909,
914, 423 N.Y.S.2d 878, 882 (no distinction between those currently unemployed and
those who might be "drawn away" from other jobs), cert denied, 446 U.S. 909 (1980).
108. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1978).
109. See Camden, 465 U.S. at 223.
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the city had substantial reasons for discriminating in the first place. 01
These opinions suggest that a state could draft a hiring preference act
limited to giving preferential treatment on public works projects to un-
employed construction laborers. However, the requirement that the
preference be substantially related to the extent to which nonresidents
had deprived residents of work indicates the need for a flexible statute. A
fixed quota of residents, for example, would not necessarily relate to the
degree to which nonresidents constituted a peculiar source of the evil,
because the employment of nonresidents could at any time threaten to
cause unemployment among residents that was higher or lower than the
level established by the quota."' It follows that, to bear a substantial
relationship to the unemployment caused by nonresidents, the act would
have to allow a state's administration to set preference levels from time to
time. The levels would depend on conditions in the industry.
4. Drafting a Model Hiring Preference Act
Taking into account all of the Supreme Court's concerns, the require-
ments of a Model Hiring Preference Act would appear to be as follows:
a. No durational requirements for residency. These violate the equal
protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.'12
b. No quota of residents. Quotas may bear no relation to the degree
to which nonresidents constitute the peculiar source of the evil."I3
c. No exemptions from discrimination for the residents of states
which offer similar exemptions in return. These reciprocal agreements
undermine the basic policy of the privileges and immunities clause."1
4
d. No retaliatory provisions enforced only against states which en-
force their own acts against the preference act's state. Again, these retal-
iatory measures undermine the basic policy of the privileges and
immunities clause.'1 5
e. Preference given only to the "unemployed" whose condition is the
"evil against which the statute is aimed." No preference given to those
who become "available" merely to switch jobs." 6
f. The state must provide at least some funding to avoid "regulating"
in conflict with the commerce clause. Also for this reason, to avoid com-
110. Id.
111. See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 393 Mass. 1201, 1205-06, 469 N.E.2d
821, 824 (1984) (statute not narrowly tailored because it extended preference to all Mas-
sachusetts residents and imposed a potentially unrelated 80% quota); see also Colo. Rev.
Stat. § 8-17-101 (1973 & Supp. 1984) (80% quota); Idaho Code § 44-1001 (1977 & Supp.
1985) (95% quota).
112. See supra note 3 1.
113. See supra note Ill and accompanying text.
114. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text.
116. See State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60, 64 (Wyo. 1985) (Thomas, C.J., concurring)
(distinguishing between those workers who were unemployed and those who became
"available"). See supra note 39 and text accompanying notes 104-08.
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merce clause challenges, the state should not impose restrictions on mu-
nicipalities or other political subdivisions of the state on projects for
which the state has provided no funds of its own. 117
g. The preference act's reach may extend only to the state's direct
dealings with primary contractors. Again, this limit is necessary to avoid
conflict with the commerce clause."18
h. The act must set up procedural steps through which the state can
produce the evidence necessary to justify discrimination in the first place
and to monitor conditions thereafter."19
Proposed Model Hiring Preference Act'm2
On showing, other than by mere conclusory evidence,12 1 after thor-
ough administrative investigation and proceedings,"~ that a desig-
nated area's construction employment opportunities for residents of
the state have been decreased by nonresidents,123 the state may require
primary1 24 contractors working on state-funded' 25 public works con-
struction projects, in that designated area, 126 to give preference to the
state's residents in hiring construction workers. Such preference shall
be limited 12 7 to those residents who are unemployed and whose unem-
ployment was caused primarily by the employment of such nonresi-
dents, and was not caused by other conditions in the state or in the
nation, or by characteristics peculiar to the residents themselves,' 28
such as, but not limited to, disparities between residents and nonresi-
dents in their ability to perform the work. Such preference shall ex-
tend, as shown by other than mere conclusory evidence, after thorough
administrative investigation and proceedings, only as long as129 non-
residents primarily-and not other conditions in the state or in the
nation, or characteristics peculiar to the residents themselves, such as,
but not limited to, disparities between residents and nonresidents in
their ability to perform the work---continue to, or would, deprive resi-
dents of construction employment opportunities in that designated
area.
117. See supra note 41.
118. See supra note 41.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02, 111.
120. The key provisions of the model act are marked by footnotes referring the reader
to other parts of this Note for relevant discussion.
121. See supra note 100.
122. See supra text accompanying note 99.
123. See supra notes 88, 90-91 and accompanying text.
124. See supra note 41.
125. See supra note 41.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 104-08.
127. See supra text accompanying notes 101-02, 111.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
129. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93, 111.
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III. THE STANDARD OF REVIEW
In March 1985, in its most recent privileges and immunities clause
decision, Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper,3 ' the Supreme
Court stated that "[i]n deciding whether the discrimination bears a close
or substantial relationship to the State's objective, the Court has consid-
ered the availability of less restrictive means." 131 In privileges and im-
munities clause cases, where the Court has found that a state has
available a choice between two ways to obtain its goals, one that discrimi-
nates and one that does not, the Court has required the state to adopt the
latter, "less restrictive," one."' Thus, the Court's practice of "consider-
ing the availability of less restrictive means" apparently has resulted in
the Court's adopting this consideration as a standard of review of state
action, a standard which requires a state to "achieve its legitimate goals
without unnecessarily discriminating against nonresidents."'
133
The question remains open whether "less restrictive means" actually
marks a change from the Court's prior analyses. If so, then the further
question remains open of whether the Court would apply the standard to
review all state actions under the privileges and immunities clause. Prior
to Piper, the Court had never used the words "less restrictive means" to
describe the standard of review appropriate for privileges and immunities
clause cases. In Toomer v. Witsell, the Court had stated that the inquiry
should "be conducted with due regard for the principle that the States
should have considerable leeway in analyzing local evils and in prescrib-
ing appropriate cures."' 134 Prior to Piper, observers and lower courts,
130. 105 S. Ct. 1272 (1985).
131. Id. at 1279.
132. For an example, see Supreme Court of N.H. v. Piper, 105 S. Ct. 1272, 1279-80
(1985). The Piper Court struck down a New Hampshire rule which limited admission to
the state's bar to residents. See id. at 1280-81. The Court found some merit in the state's
contention that nonresident lawyers would be more likely to miss unscheduled hearings
or proceedings, but stated that precluding nonresidents from practice altogether could
not be condoned when less restrictive means were available. Id. at 1280. The nonresi-
dent, for example, could retain a local attorney to attend such meetings in his or her
place. Id. As to the state's concern that nonresidents would be less likely to perform pro
bono work, the Court noted that the state could adopt the less restrictive condition that
nonresidents devote a certain proportion of their time to representing indigents. Id. A
total bar to practice was unnecessary.
133. Id. at 1279 n.17.
134. Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948). Even so, the Court was not clear on
the comparative strictness of this review. The "considerable leeway" test does not sound
as stringent as "strict scrutiny" or "less restrictive means." The Toomer Court's test
stated that the discrimination must bear a "close relation" to the state's objectives, see id.,
an arguably strict test. Later in the opinion, however, when the Court summarized its
holding and restated the test, it used the words "reasonable relationship" as the connec-
tion between the degree of discrimination and the justification. See id. at 403. The Court
also noted that a state may not "discriminate without reason against citizens of other
States." Id. at 402.
Guidance on the meaning of such language of scrutiny might be found in the Court's
equal protection clause analyses. If the state has neither discriminated against a "suspect
class" nor infringed a "fundamental right," San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodri-
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drawing on Toomer's "considerable leeway" language, had interpreted
the Court's opinions to require a less strict standard of review in privi-
leges and immunities clause cases than in equal protection clause
cases. 135
In any case, whatever the other eight members of the Piper Court may
have believed the standard to have been in earlier cases under the privi-
leges and immunities clause, the lone dissenter, Justice Rehnquist, be-
lieved that the Court had taken a dramatic step.' 36 Justice Rehnquist
strongly opposed what he called the majority's "loose language concern-
ing 'less restrictive means,' ,137 as "ill-advised and potentially unmanage-
able." 138 But the majority explicitly rejected Justice Rehnquist's urging
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973), then the standard of review of legislation which affects one
group differently from another is whether it "bears some rational relationship to a legiti-
mate state purpose." Id. at 44. Under the "rational basis" standard of review, state
legislation that results in "some inequality" need not be struck down solely because it
"imperfectly effectuates the State's goals" or because the state could have implemented
"less drastic" means. Id. at 51.
135. See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 393 Mass. 1201, 1208, 469 N.E.2d
821, 826 (1984) (quoting "considerable leeway" language of Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S.
385, 396 (1948)); Laborers Local Union No. 374 v. Felton Constr. Co., 98 Wash. 2d 121,
131-32, 654 P.2d 67, 72 (1982) (en banc) (privileges and immunities analysis calls for at
least intermediate level of scrutiny and may require strict scrutiny); J. Nowak, R. Ro-
tunda & J. Young, supra note 31, ch.12, § I.C., at 414 ("reasonably relate to legitimate
state or local purposes"); L. Tribe, supra note 30, § 6-33, at 411 & n.17 (suggesting exist-
ence of different standards of review under privileges and immunities clause and equal
protection clause).
Indeed, the Court itself added to the confusion. In invoking the Toomer test in Hicklin
v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 525-27 (1978), Justice Brennan first quoted the Toomer language
of "reasonable relationship" (the later Toomer wording), see id. at 526, but then referred
to the need to find a "substantial relationship," see id. at 527, the language used subse-
quently in Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1279.
136. See 105 S. Ct. at 1281 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 1282 n.1 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 1284 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The majority's analytical standard, Justice
Rehnquist feared, "when carried too far, will ultimately lead to striking down almost any
statute on the ground that the Court could think of another 'less restrictive' way to write
it." Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that the Court's "less restric-
tive means" analysis came from the Court's first amendment jurisprudence, and argued
that it was "out of place in the context" of the privileges and immunities clause. See id.
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). For privileges and immunities purposes, he urged that the
policy should be to uphold a statute if the state's legislature had "merely a legitimate
reason" for having chosen one solution over another less restrictive alternative. The
state's discriminatory statute, he suggested, could be struck down if the state had an
illegitimate purpose for making distinctions between residents and nonresidents. See id.
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Such a low standard of review may have been in Justice Rehnquist's mind when he
quoted with approval the Toomer "considerable leeway" language in his opinion in Cam-
den. See United Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208,
222-23 (1984) (quoting Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948)). If so, then the
Wyoming Chief Justice correctly interpreted the Camden holding by finding no reason
for the Wyoming Court to remand the case before it on the constitutionality of Wyo-
ming's preference act. See State v. Antonich, 694 P.2d 60, 65 (Wyo. 1985) (Thomas, CJ.,
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that they adopt a standard as limited as the one he proposed. 39
The Court has not yet considered what "less restrictive means" signi-
fies in a case where the state compels nongovernmental entities to dis-
criminate against nonresidents as a condition for receiving state funds.
Piper involved a complete bar to nonresident lawyers at no direct finan-
cial cost to the state, which differs from the situation before the Court in
Camden, where the city was funding public works projects. In Camden,
the Court quoted the Toomer "considerable leeway" language,' 40 and ob-
served that a state's spending its own money to remedy local ills was
"perhaps the crucial factor" in determining whether the state's action
should sustain challenge under the privileges and immunities clause. 14
This dictum in Camden suggests that the Court might balance the fea-
sibility of a state's choices in determining whether to allow the state to
discriminate through a hiring preference act. The Court noted that the
Camden ordinance lacked the overbroad "ripple effect" of the act struck
down in Hicklin v. Orbeck, and was "limited in scope to employees work-
ing directly on city public works projects."' 4
But, if Camden's dictum should be read as narrowing the otherwise
unqualified more recent wording in Piper, then the Court's dictum in
Hicklin v. Orbeck also may be read as qualifying that in Camden.
Although in Hicklin v. Orbeck the state was merely allocating its natural
resources, not spending its own funds, the Court did state that it was a
"dubious" assumption that a state could ever discriminate against non-
residents to solve an unemployment problem, 43 and one that "may pres-
ent serious constitutional questions."'"
Because the Court has used the words "less restrictive means" only in
its most recent privileges and immunities clause decision, it remains un-
certain whether the Court will view this consideration as requiring a
stringent review in all cases, or, depending on a particular case's facts, as
permitting different degrees of review along a continuum from "consider-
able leeway" to "strict scrutiny." In cases prior to Piper, the language
concurring). Certainly, Wyoming could have shown a "mere legitimate basis" for im-
proving its local employment situation by limiting jobs to residents. See supra note 100.
"And in any event," Justice Rehnquist concluded, "courts should not play the game
that the Court has played here-independently scrutinizing each asserted state interest to
see if it could devise a better way than the State to accomplish that goal." Piper, 105 S.
Ct. at 1284 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
139. See Piper, 105 S. Ct. at 1279 n.17. Writing for the Court, Justice Powell re-
sponded that Justice Rehnquist's view would lead to condoning a state's discriminatory
means in every case unless the state had discriminated "for its own sake." Id. Justice
Powell believed that a test as limited as that proposed by Justice Rehnquist was insuffi-
cient to ensure constitutional protection under the privileges and immunities clause. "In
some cases," he observed, "the State may be required to achieve its legitimate goals with-
out unnecessarily discriminating against nonresidents." Id.
140. See Camden, 465 U.S. at 222-23.
141. See id. at 221.
142. Id. at 223.
143. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 526 (1978).
144. See id. at 528.
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the Court used to apply a standard of review under the privileges and
immunities clause is similar to the language used to discuss the "strict
scrutiny" standard which the Supreme Court has applied in analyzing
state discrimination under other clauses. 4 Thus, if the Court intends to
view "less restrictive means" as a standard with a fixed degree of review,
its earlier practice suggests that the standard might be similar to the stan-
dards of review applied in cases of discrimination involving "suspect
classes" and in cases of infringement of "fundamental rights" under the
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment.' 46 To justify racial
or ethnic distinctions, the state has been required to prove a compelling
interest in rectifying past violations of a particular group's rights, and to
prove that the particular remedy is "necessary" to effect that interest.1
47
The Court has used similar language to describe the standard under the
privileges and immunities clause, and has required that the means of dis-
crimination be "closely tailored" to remedy the state's concern. 4 8
145. See Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957-58 (1982) (com-
merce clause); San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973)
(discussing standards under equal protection clause of fourteenth amendment); see also
United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
146. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1973).
147. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 480, 491 (1980) ("most searching exami-
nation" required to evaluate whether remedy is "narrowly tailored" to state's goal), Re-
gents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291-99 (1978) ("exacting judicial
scrutiny" used to determine whether remedy is "precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest").
The Court has distinguished the degree of scrutiny required to analyze gender-based
distinctions under the equal protection clause. According to the Court, gender-based
classifications constitute a "middle-tier" level of discrimination requiring a somewhat less
strict approach. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 210-11 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring).
Here, the Court need find only that the classification serves a "fair and substantial rela-
tion to the object of the legislation." Id. at 211. The Court has been less inclined to
require a "strict scrutiny" approach to gender-based classifications because, as there are
only two "groups," the burdens of the preferences given one group are more easily identi-
fied than the burdens of preferences concerning multiple racial or ethnic groups. See
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 302-03. Furthermore, the Court believes that it can more easily deter-
mine and review the effect of the burden to be placed on the one sex or the remedial steps
giving preference to the other. See id. Therefore, the Court has not found that gender-
based distinctions are inherently suspect. See id.
However, the Court's justifications for requiring a lower level of review to gender-based
distinctions do not apply well to discrimination against nonresidents. In particular, the
gender group put at a disadvantage by a gender-based classification, by definition, has an
"equal" opportunity, not available to nonresidents, to remedy the discrimination at the
polls. It is just such a political power that the Court found important in determining
whether a group could constitute a "suspect class" justifying strict scrutiny for its protec-
tion. See San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (clause
protects class which has been "relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to
command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process"). True, non-
residents may seek to remedy discrimination through enacting similar statutes in their
own states, but such retaliatory measures are precisely what the privileges and immuni-
ties clause was designed to prevent. See Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 662-63
(1975) (nonresidents taxed under challenged scheme had no access to state's legislative
process).
148. Compare Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 528 (1978) (privileges and immunities
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Similarly, in its review of commerce clause cases, the Supreme Court
has stated that, when a state's "facial discrimination" restricts the flow of
commerce, the state's purposes and means require the "strictest scrutiny
* . . and the absence of nondiscriminatory alternatives."' 149 Because the
"mutually reinforcing"' 5 ° clauses were designed to protect similar con-
cerns in the interests of interstate harmony and the free flow of com-
merce between the states, 5 ' it follows that the standard of review under
one clause could be similar in degree to the standard under the other
clause.
clause decision stating that state's remedy "must be more closely tailored") (emphasis
added) and Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 398 (1948) (privileges and immunities clause
decision stating that even if state's concerns were valid, they would not "necessarily sup-
port a remedy so drastic") (emphasis added) with San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1973) (An equal protection clause decision stating that
"strict scrutiny means that the State's system is not entitled to the usual presumption of
validity, that the State rather than the complainants must carry a 'heavy burden of justifi-
cation,' that the State must demonstrate that its . . . system has been structured with
'precision,' and is 'tailored' narrowly to serve legitimate objectives and that it has selected
the 'less drastic means' for effectuating its objectives.") (emphasis added).
149. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337 (1979) (striking down state bar to ex-
ports of minnows naturally seined in its streams). In South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237 (1984), the Court struck down an Alaska statute which re-
quired customers of state-owned lumber to process their logs at mills within the state.
Such a "regulation" of the purchasers' downstream private transactions, after their direct
dealings with the state had ended, inhibited the interstate trade in timber. Id. at 2246-47.
Had Alaska offered a subsidy to timber purchasers as an inducement to their sending
their timber to Alaskan processors, the state could have achieved its aim of promoting the
in-state timber processing industry, and would have done so without violating the com-
merce clause. Id. at 2244. The timber purchaser would not have been forced to accept
the state's conditions to obtain the lumber, but would have had, in effect, the "less restric-
tive" choice of accepting the subsidy and using an Alaskan processor, or foregoing the
subsidy and transporting the timber out of the state. This lack of choice between buying
the timber subject to the state's "regulation" or not buying it at all was a key element in
the plurality's holding against the state. See id.
It was unimportant, Justice White wrote, "that the State could support its processing
industry by selling only to Alaska processors, by vertical integration, or by direct sub-
sidy." Id. at 2246. Thus, while Alaska had available numerous ways to accomplish its
goals, it had chosen a discriminatory means which was not the least restrictive. Because
nondiscriminatory, less restrictive means were available, the Court would not tolerate
those the state had chosen in violation of the Constitution.
The Court has taken similar measures in numerous commerce clause cases. See
Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 957-58 (1982) ("facially discrimina-
tory legislation" which is subject to the "strictest scrutiny" was not "narrowly tailored to
the conservation and preservation rationale"); Great Atd. and Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell,
424 U.S. 366, 376-77 (1976) (Mississippi reciprocity requirement barring Louisiana milk
was not least restrictive means); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354
(195 1) ("reasonable nondiscriminatory alternatives"); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294
U.S. 511, 524 (1935) (goal of healthy milk could be attained through normal certification
and inspection rather than complete bar).
150. Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531-32 (1978).
151. See supra Part I.A.
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IV. THE EFFECTS OF A "LESS RESTRICTIVE MEANS"
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The constitutionality of any hiring preference act will depend on the
degree of scrutiny which the Court chooses to apply in its standard of
review of state action. If the Court retains its Camden language of "con-
siderable leeway" and balances the possible additional economic and
political costs of the available means which are less restrictive against the
degree of discrimination against nonresidents, a hiring preference act,
like the Model Hiring Preference Act constructed above, might comply
with the Court's other privileges and immunities clause concerns, raised
in Camden and Hicklin v. Orbeck, and survive constitutional chal-
lenge.'" 2 If, however, the Court interprets its recent Piper language as
requiring a state to adopt a nondiscriminatory alternative, then a statute
will fail to survive constitutional challenge if the Court finds that a state
has available means which are less restrictive.
The Supreme Court's ultimate decision will be significant because the
state may have a number of choices to remedy unemployment. A private
contractor may turn down a resident and choose to hire a nonresident
who can better perform the job, or who is willing to work at a lower wage
or for fewer benefits. The Supreme Court suggests that a state probably
may not discriminate against nonresidents on the ground of ability to
perform the work,'53 but the Court has not foreclosed a state from find-
ing that such a disparity in the cost of nonresident labor had led to non-
residents constituting a peculiar source of the evil, if their willingness to
work at a lower cost had made it difficult for residents to secure employ-
ment. If a state offered a direct subsidy to private contractors for each
resident worker they employed, a direct subsidy which erased the cost
advantage held by nonresidents, the private contractor could choose to
hire either worker.'54 But a bar to nonresidents would allow private con-
tractors no choice and would discriminate against nonresidents. 5
Because a state may condition payments for direct subsidies or unem-
ployment benefits on residency without violating the privileges and im-
munities clause,'56 these forms of remedying unemployment would be
152. See supra Part III.
153. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 525-27 (1978).
154. Whether the possible increase in administrative burden would make offering di-
rect subsidies an impractical way to secure higher employment for residents is beyond the
scope of this Note.
155. It was this lack of choice on whether to send lumber to an in-state mill, which the
State's conditions of sale forced on purchasers of Alaska's timber, that the Court found
significant in holding that the state violated the commerce clause. See South-Central
Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 104 S. Ct. 2237, 2244 (1984).
156. See id. at 2244 (subsidies for timber processing). Cf. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap
Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 809-10 (1976) (considering under the commerce clause subsidies for
automobile hulks); Memorial Hosp. v. Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250, 254 (1974)
(under the equal protection clause striking down only durational residency requirement
of program for state-supported free nonemergency medical care); Shapiro v. Thompson,
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less restrictive than using a preference act to ban nonresidents from
working in the state.
Rather than imposing conditions on private contractors, the state
could avoid constitutional challenge by directly hiring unemployed con-
struction workers.' 57 Indeed, the state could hire even those who were
"available" or employed. This remedy for unemployment would also be
less restrictive than a hiring preference act.
Finally, the Supreme Court would probably see no difficulty with a
state's creating job training programs 5 ' or adopting "aggressive referral
practices.' 59 These are further examples of less restrictive means.
Any of these programs would avoid discrimination and would relieve
the state of the burdens of forming a procedure flexible enough to survive
constitutional challenge. The Supreme Court's requirement that a state
show a causal connection would probably make difficult and inefficient
the task of monitoring closely whether nonresidents ceased to be a pecu-
liar source of the evil of unemployment, or constituted an evil in the first
place. Even if a state could form a constitutionally permissible procedure
incorporated in a hiring preference act, the procedure of close monitor-
ing would probably present an administrative nightmare. Thus, the tre-
mendous effort of drafting such a statute would hardly seem worth the
time and expense, especially when the benefits could extend only to em-
ployees of the state's primary contractors.
In addition, if the Court does adopt a stringent "less restrictive means"
standard of review, it effectively will render all hiring preference acts-
including statutes as limited in scope and as procedurally flexible as the
Model Hiring Preference Act constructed above-violations of the privi-
leges and immunities clause.
The Court should adopt a stringent "less restrictive means" standard
of review for hiring preference acts. A person's being deprived by the
state of job opportunities offered by a private employer runs counter to
the purpose of a unified American economy. Ultimately, allowing such
discrimination leads to retaliation. 60
394 U.S. 618, 627 (1969) (striking down only durational residency requirement to qualify
for welfare benefits).
157. See McCarthy v. Philadelphia Civil Serv. Comm'n, 424 U.S. 645, 646-47 (1976)
(per curiam) (civil service employment); see also White v. Massachusetts Council of
Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204, 211 n.7 (1983) (city was not a regulator because
private contractors' employees were essentially "working for the city"); Reeves, Inc. v.
Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 441 (1980) (state-owned and operated cement plant); Massachusetts
Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (per curiam) (no fundamental
right to government employment under the equal protection clause).
158. See Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 527-28 (1978) (dictum).
159. See White v. Massachussetts Council of Constr. Employers, Inc., 460 U.S. 204,
225 (1983) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
160. See supra Part I.A. The Supreme Court distinguishes between public and private
employment in reviewing state action to compel discrimination against nonresidents. A
discussion of whether this distinction makes sense, in light of the purpose to promote a
unified economy and to prevent retaliation, is beyond the scope of this Note.
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The already widespread use of preference acts attests to their retalia-
tory effects and the ease of adoption as a potential remedy. Those who
are hurt by the acts' enforcement cannot vote against the legislators who
choose that form of discrimination to benefit their constituents.
A state has numerous means, other than hiring preference acts, to dis-
criminate against nonresidents by allocating benefits solely to residents to
reduce the pain of unemployment. But, a state's use of direct subsidies,
unemployment benefits, or direct hiring of workers to benefit its local
residents would be far more difficult to initiate and administer than
merely enforcing a preference act barring nonresidents. The state's di-
rect action, such as allocating subsidies or benefits, would require the
appropriation of tax revenue. Taxes are unpopular and involve the dis-
advantages of a political check, which a state might avoid by passing a
statute and shifting the "harm" to those who are not members of the
electorate.
Indeed, by creating a political check on a state's choice to benefit its
own citizens at the expense of nonresidents, the state could encounter
political hurdles as difficult to clear as the constitutional requirements of
the privileges and immunities clause. Where a state would be unable to
justify to its own residents the extra cost associated with benefiting only
their unemployed, the Constitution should not permit making such dis-
crimination any easier.16 1
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's opinions require a substantial narrowing of the
scope of preference acts and make necessary substantial procedural safe-
guards. The Camden Court required a state show a relation between
nonresidents and the unemployment suffered by its residents. Such a re-
quirement may be too stringent to permit a state to draft a statute which
would be manageable for the state to administer. Furthermore, if the
Court adopts a strict standard of review, a question left open after Piper,
it will, in effect, render all hiring preference acts violations of the privi-
leges and immunities clause.
The Court should adopt a strict standard of review. The privileges and
immunities clause seeks to preclude the states from creating a multitude
of discriminatory pockets, a situation made more likely by the Wyoming
court's recent holding. The Supreme Court should act before other
states follow the unwise lead of the Supreme Court of Wyoming in up-
161. See South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 185 n.2
(1938) ("when the regulation is of such a character that its burden falls principally upon
those without the state, legislative action is not likely to be subjected to those political
restraints which are normally exerted on legislation where it affects adversely some inter-
ests within the state"); J. Nowak, R. Rotunda & J. Young, supra note 31, ch. 9, § III, at
280-81.
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holding their own state's acts, and should clarify this area of the law by
holding definitively that hiring preference acts are per se unlawful.
Thomas H. Day
